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• We analyze price-advertising competition with horizontally differentiated products when firms
can use mass advertising, opt-in direct advertising or direct advertising without permission.
• Compared to opt-in advertising, the use of direct advertising without permission results in
lower or equal prices and higher or equal profits for firms.
• A fraction of consumers refuse the offer to receive opt-in advertising and we prove that this
fraction is, from a social perspective, too large.
• A regulatory policy banning the use of direct advertising without permission in favor of opt-in













Direct Advertising and Opt-in provisions: policy
and market implications




This paper formulates a game of pricing and informative advertising with horizontally-
differentiated products in which two firms, first, compete with mass advertising and, later,
build a database using their historical sales records and compete by targeting the ads to their
potential customers. We study market interaction under two types of direct advertising: opt-in
advertising, where firms ask consumers for their consent to send them ads with information
about new products, and direct advertising without permission, where sellers use consumer con-
tact information without their explicit consent. We show that, compared to the case where firms
only use mass media, the use of direct ads (with or without permission) results in an intertem-
poral reallocation of market power from the first to the second period and that, compared to
opt-in advertising, direct advertising without permission results in lower or equal prices. We
also evaluate the impact of a regulatory policy aimed at protecting consumer privacy by banning
the use of direct advertising without permission in favor of opt-in advertising. We find that this
policy lowers social welfare and, if the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently high (vs.
low), it does not affect (vs. lowers) firm profits and lowers (vs. increases) consumer surplus.
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The emergence of new information-transmission technologies has led to fundamental changes in
firms’ communication strategies. According to the marketing literature, sellers today tend to use
mass advertising media to capture new clients, but use personal direct media when developing a
relationship with existing customers. Effective direct advertising begins with a consumer database
that includes an organized collection of comprehensive data about existing or prospective cus-
tomers. On the basis of this information, marketers can target small groups of potential clients and
promote their new products through personalized communication, thus providing firms a low-cost,
efficient alternative for reaching their markets. This explains why database advertising has become
increasingly important and is now extensively used by sellers.1
The most important forms of direct advertising include telemarketing and direct mail, which
together account for 52% of all sales engendered by direct marketing (Kotler et al., 2013). These
information transmission technologies use a telephone call, fax, SMS, postal mail2 or email to obtain
an immediate response from customers and cultivate lasting relationships. Taking into account the
old marketing adage of ”it is easier to sell something to an existing customer than make a new
one”, marketers often achieve these goals simply by building a database with the contact details of
their existing customers and using the database to send them direct advertising with information
about new products or services. Against this background, it is interesting to investigate how the
strategic use of direct advertising based on historical sales records can affect the functioning of the
markets. Further, we are particularly interested in the policy aspects of database advertising. It is
clear that the informative role of advertising and the high cost-efficiency of direct advertising make
this marketing tool socially desirable. However, a fraction of consumers receiving, for example,
telephone calls, may not be interested in the promoted products and consider such advertising
intrusive, thus generating ”nuisance costs”. These costs can have a strong negative impact on
social welfare, so the protection of consumers’ privacy can justify government intervention. One
regulatory solution can be to introduce an opt-in provision in the use of direct advertising, so that
firms must ask consumers for their explicit consent to be included in the database and to send
them messages, in return for valuable information about new products or services. From a social
perspective, the advantage of opt-in advertising is that the audience of the campaign becomes
1According to the US Direct Marketing Association (DMA), in 2011, marketers spent $163 billion on direct
marketing, which accounted for 52.1% of all ad expenditures in the United States (see DMA’s ”Power of Direct
Marketing Report”).
2The DMA reports that offline marketing channels, mainly direct–mail (non-catalog) and telephone marketing,
account for the bulk of advertising dollars in 2016. However, DMA expects digital channels to continue increasing













highly qualified, thus mitigating the impact of nuisance costs. The aim of this paper is to provide
a theoretical framework in which to investigate how the use of direct advertising, with and without
opt-in provisions, can affect consumers and firms, to shed light on how public policies towards
database advertising (e.g. to allow direct advertising without permission, or to ban this type of
advertising with an opt-in provision) can affect the level of social welfare.
We formulate a model of price competition in which two firms sell horizontally-differentiated
products. To accommodate direct advertising based on historical sales records into the model, we
consider that sellers launch a succession of new products over time. Consumers are unaware of the
existence and characteristics of the goods and firms use informative advertising to promote sales.
For the sake of simplicity, we reduce the analysis to three stages, τ = 0, 1, 2. In the first, sellers
do not have the information necessary to target their ads, so they compete on price and reach
consumers by using a TV or radio mass advertising campaign that covers the entire market and
provides information about the existence of a new product, price, characteristics, etc. In τ = 1, the
informed consumers make their purchasing decisions, i.e. they decide whether or not to purchase
a product and from which firm. Finally, in τ = 2, firms launch a new product and compete by
choosing their pricing and advertising strategies (mass advertising or direct advertising).
A model of database advertising based on historical sales records only makes sense if the firms’
intertemporal demands are correlated. We assume that the different goods produced by the two
firms over time are oriented to the same group of potential consumers so, in order to generate repeat
business, a firm has a high incentive to foster a relationship with its potential “regular” customers,
that is to say, with those consumers who purchased its product in τ = 1. This is done by taking
advantage of the first sale to obtain a profile of the clients (name, address, telephone number, email,
etc.) and create a database that in τ = 2 can be used to send direct ads with information about
new products or services.3 The distinctive feature of our model is that marketers can implement a
direct advertising campaign in two different ways. One, they can send direct messages to all their
past clients, without asking for their permission. We will refer to this advertising strategy as ”direct
advertising without permission”. The other way is to ask consumers for their consent to include
their personal information in the database and send messages only to those clients who have given
their explicit consent. We will refer to this advertising strategy as ”opt-in direct advertising”. We
assume that only a fraction of first-period buyers are interested in the second-period products and
3In-house lists with information about existing customers have been used by firms for a long time. For example,
Kotler and Armstrong (1998) report that General Electric has constructed databases containing the purchasing record
for electro-domestic goods of each customer. On the basis of this information, the firm has used direct mail to offer














that consumers suffer a ”nuisance cost” when they receive direct messages (e.g. telephone calls)
informing them about the existence and characteristics of products in which they are not interested.
We can interpret this as a ”privacy cost”, which reflects the opportunity cost of the time spent in
receiving and processing the information transmitted by the commercial messages, and we assume
that consumers have heterogeneous privacy costs. Clearly, the effectiveness of direct advertising
without permission and opt-in advertising will be different. Whereas, in the first case, all first-period
clients receive an ad, so all are exposed to the advertising campaign, with opt-in advertising, only
a fraction of these consumers (with relatively low privacy cost) will give permission to be included
in the database and only they will be reached by the corresponding advertising campaign. This
explains that firms have a clear incentive to use direct advertising without permission, and the
problem is that this type of advertising can generate high privacy costs, because consumers who are
not interested in second-period products and have relatively high privacy costs receive undesired
direct ads. Thus, consumer protection can justify government intervention aimed at reducing
privacy costs by imposing an opt-in provision on the use of direct advertising. The issue is how does
this provision affect consumers, firms, and the level of social welfare. To address these questions, the
first phase of our work compares the functioning of the market under three competition scenarios: (i)
sellers use only mass advertising: this case, which equals the full-information outcome, constitutes
a reasonable benchmark against which we can compute the impact of database advertising on the
market outcome, (ii) regulation (opt-in provision): in τ = 2, sellers can use only mass advertising
or opt-in direct advertising and (iii) no regulation: in τ = 2, sellers can use any type of advertising
(mass advertising or direct advertising with or without permission).
When firms employ direct advertising, the key point is that the use, in τ = 2, of an in-house list
with contact information about existing clients (with or without their permission) allows sellers to
target their advertising campaigns to a distinct set of consumers, which fragments the market into
local monopolies due to the information-differentiation that arises. Firms strategically anticipate
this effect so, compared to the benchmark, they compete more aggressively for consumers in the
initial period, that is, we prove that database advertising results in an intertemporal transfer of
market power from τ = 0 to τ = 2. Interestingly, we find that firms could find it optimal to offer
their first-period products at zero price. This can be interpreted as an aggressive introductory
offer aimed at building a large customer base in τ = 1, which allows sellers to better market their
products in τ = 2. Regarding profits, if first-period prices are positive, direct advertising (with or
without permission) yields lower firm profits than does mass advertising, whereas, if first-period
prices are zero, profits can increase. This means that firms may engage in a typical prisoner’s













incentive to use their databases, indirectly generating more intense price competition in τ = 0 and,
as a result, lower intertemporal aggregate profits. Finally, we find that the pricing strategy and
the level of profits can vary depending on whether firms use opt-in advertising or direct advertising
without permission. We show that second-period prices coincide with the two types of direct
advertising, while opt-in advertising yields higher (or equal) first-period prices and lower (or equal)
aggregate firm profits.
The second phase is to evaluate a regulatory policy aimed at protecting consumer privacy by
imposing an opt-in provision on the use of direct advertising. It is clear that opt-in advertising
reduces consumer privacy costs, thus increasing welfare, but, under this type of advertising, a
fraction of consumers refuse the offer to be included in the database and we prove that, compared
to the socially-optimal solution, this fraction is too large. This generates a negative externality
on firms and a quantity distortion in the product market, with the corresponding welfare loss.
The key point, then, is which of these effects is dominant, and we find that a regulatory policy
banning the use of direct advertising without permission and generating opt-in advertising results in
a welfare loss. To understand this, we note that, given the relatively high cost of a mass advertising
campaign, it is socially desirable that firms employ database advertising. However, if the use of
direct advertising without permission is prohibited, then, having mass advertising available, firms
will find it optimal to use opt-in advertising only if it is relatively efficient, i.e. if the campaign
has a wide reach, which requires low privacy costs. In this set-up, we show that the gain in social
welfare induced by the savings in privacy costs is smaller than the welfare loss generated by the
quantity distortion induced by opt-in advertising, so government intervention is socially detrimental.
Regarding firms and consumers, we find that, if the degree of product differentiation in the market
is relatively large, a regulatory policy banning the use of direct advertising without permission and
resulting in opt-in advertising does not affect firms’ profits and lowers consumer surplus, whereas,
under low differentiation, the regulation lowers profits and increases consumer surplus. In sum, our
welfare analysis yields a remarkable result, namely, that a regulatory policy aimed at protecting
consumers could end up leaving firm profits unchanged but lowering both consumer surplus and
social welfare.
These results have interesting implications for the evaluation of the distinct regulatory ap-
proaches towards direct advertising implemented by the European Union and the US. The EU is
clearly concerned with the defense of consumer privacy in commercial relationships, which is pro-
tected by (i) a common European regulation, (ii) national agencies that supervise and prevent the
incorrect use of commercial information, and (iii) a severe penalty mechanism that punishes the













mercial information and so, for example, there is neither a general regulation nor a central agency
of data protection. Our model suggests that the US regulatory approach, close to direct advertising
without permission, may well improve market performance. Nevertheless, it is clear that, beyond
the gains in efficiency illustrated by our model, the abusive and massive use of private information
may be considered by many consumers to be overly intrusive, thus generating substantial losses in
social welfare, which can justify the European regulatory approach towards direct advertising, more
inclined towards opt-in advertising. While the computation of this ”intrusive effect” is beyond the
scope of the current paper, our work strongly suggests that, in order to find an ”optimal” regula-
tory policy towards direct advertising, it is important to carefully take into account the potential
negative efficiency effects induced by a restrictive approach to the use of private information in
commercial relationships.
Our work relates to recent economics literature on informative advertising and targeting, which
has focused mainly on how specialized advertising media, such as magazines, newspapers and cable
TV, can be used to target potential consumers, as well as on the bearing of these technologies on
market outcomes. Some contributions in this area are those of Esteban, Gil and Hernández (2001),
Iyer et al. (2005), Galeotti and Moraga (2008) and Esteban and Hernández (2011, 2016). However,
the analysis of direct advertising in a competitive setting4 has received little attention and, to the
best of our knowledge, only the works of Shaffer and Zhang (1995), Roy (2000) and Esteban and
Hernández (2014) have addressed this issue. The first of these analyzes the case in which firms have
a fixed-size database containing precise information on consumers which allows them to both locate
and classify these customers according to their brand loyalty. Given this information, the authors
show that direct advertising allows for price discrimination by way of coupons, which stimulates
competition in the market. Roy (2000) places the analysis within a spatial framework in which
firms can send their ads directly, given that they know the physical location of all consumers.
In this context, the use of direct advertising can lead to market fragmentation and the creation
of local monopolies. We note that the results provided by Shaffer and Zhang (1995) depend on
the information contained in the database and the origin of this information is exogenous. While
Roy’s approach provides an answer to the question of how to locate potential consumers, this
model5 applies only to a spatial context in which consumers have homogeneous tastes. Esteban
and Hernández (2014) study database advertising based on historical sales records in a context of
heterogeneous tastes, and investigate how direct advertising affects both pricing and advertising
4Esteban, Gil and Hernández (2004) analyze the use of database advertising in a monopoly setting.
5We note that Roy (2000) formulates a two-stage model, where two firms first decide the advertising strategy and
then compete in prices (the ads do not mention prices). The timing of this game suggests that advertising has a













levels when firms face a totally inelastic demand. The present work puts the accent on the analysis
of pricing strategies when firms face an elastic demand. Further, our main contribution to the
existing literature is to analyze the functioning of the market under opt-in direct advertising, that
is, we study database advertising when consumers choose whether or not to be included in a firm’s
database. On this basis, we provide a theoretical framework in which to evaluate the effects of a
regulatory policy towards database advertising.
Finally, our work also connects to the literature on ad-blocking. Johnson (2013) analyzes
how the increasing ability of firms to target their ads to particular individuals affects the market
outcome when consumers have access to advertising avoidance tools. The paper formulates a model
where firms only compete for the attention of consumers, but they do not compete in the product
market, and shows that improved targeting leads to higher firm profits, and that consumers may
under-utilize advertising-avoidance technologies. Anderson (2010) formulates a two-sided model in
which a monopolist provider supplies content to consumers and sells advertising space to firms, and
analyzes the content provider’s reaction to the use of ad-avoidance technologies (such as remote
controls, pop-up adblockers, etc.). The paper shows that the adoption of ad-avoidance technologies
may reduce total welfare and content quality. Our model provides a different framework in which
to evaluate the effects of consumer ad-blocking on the market outcome, namely, price and direct-
advertising competition in the product market, and finds that (i) improved targeting can lead
to lower firm profits, (ii) consumers may over-utilize advertising-avoidance tools, and (iii) the
possibility of ad-blocking may reduce total welfare.
The remainder of the work is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model and describes
the functioning of the market under mass advertising and direct advertising. Section 3 discusses the
welfare and policy implications of database advertising. Finally, Section 4 contains some concluding
remarks. All the proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The model: equilibrium analysis
We consider two firms, j = 1, 2, launching one new product in τ = 0 and another in τ = 2, and
competing in prices, (pτ1 , p
τ
2) for a group of consumers. Potential buyers are uninformed of the
existence and characteristics of the goods and firms use advertising to promote sales. To model the
interaction between uninformed consumers and firms selling differentiated products and competing
in prices and advertising, we use a simple version of the familiar model of Tirole (1988). We assume
that the firms are located at the extremes of a linear potential market, of unit length, along which













period. We interpret the linear market, [0, 1], as the space of a given characteristic and we assume
that at each point of the market, 1 ≥ x ≥ 0, there is a density N of consumers. Let vτ be the
consumers’ common valuation of their favorite variety in period τ . For the sake of simplicity, we
consider that v0 = v2 = v. If firm 1 is located at the left end of the market, a consumer located at
a distance x from this seller achieves a utility U = v− tx− p1 from buying firm 1’s product, where
tx represents a linear transportation cost, i.e. the cost in terms of utility of not having the favorite
good available.6 The marginal cost of production is constant and, for the sake of simplicity, we
normalize this cost to zero.
Regarding the information structure of the model, we assume that consumers are endowed with
preferences over product attributes but, without advertising, they are unaware of the existence
of the goods or their characteristics.7 Advertising provides information about the existence of a
new product and its characteristics, including the price, so a consumer can (1) learn the product
attributes, (2) evaluate the degree of preference for the good and (3) decide whether to buy it or
not. In τ = 0, firms reach consumers by using the mass-advertising media (TV, radio, press, etc.),
which cover the entire market at a cost A per consumer. The fundamental feature of our model is
that, in τ = 0, a firm anticipates that, in τ = 2, it will again launch a new product, and marketers
may have an incentive to develop and maintain a direct relationship with their potential buyers. A
model of database advertising based on historical sales records only makes sense if a firm’s demands
in τ = 0 and τ = 2 are correlated, so we assume that both demands stem from the same mass of
consumers located within the interval [0, 1]. Further, we can expect that the ordering of consumers
with respect to the valuation they place on the goods in τ = 0 and τ = 2 do not necessarily have
to coincide, so we consider that the location of consumers along the line in τ = 2 is independent
of their locations8 in τ = 0. We also assume that, in the first sale, a firm can capture its clients’
contact information (name, address, telephone number, etc.) and build a database which, in τ = 2,
can be used to send them a direct ad with information about the existence, price, and characteristics
of the new product. Accordingly, we assume that firms have three marketing tools available which
can serve to materialize the demand in τ = 2. First, a seller could launch a new mass advertising
6We are also assuming a similar pattern of product differentiation in τ = 0 and τ = 2, but the model can easily
be extended to consider that consumer valuation and/or the pattern of product differentiation changes over time.
7We assume that consumers do not search for information about products and firms must periodically launch an
advertising campaign to facilitate consideration of its product by consumers. With this assumption, we are in line
with the mainstream of the informative advertising literature, which considers that consumers’ search cost is high
relative to the expected surplus offered by the goods so, in the absence of information, consumers do not purchase
any good (see, for example, Grossman and Shapiro, 1984; Stegeman, 1991; Stahl, 1994). Later, in footnote 14, we
will specify the conditions under which this assumption holds.













campaign informing all potential consumers of the existence of the new product. The second way
to reach consumers in τ = 2 is to ask consumers for their explicit consent to be included in the
database, and send a direct message only to those who explicitly agree to receive ads (opt-in direct
advertising). The last alternative is to use direct advertising without permission, that is, the firm
send a direct ad to all the clients in the database.
We consider that only a fraction λ < 1 of first-period buyers are interested in the second-period
products and that consumers suffer a ”nuisance cost” when they receive direct advertising (e.g.
telephone calls) about products in which they are not interested.9 This loss of utility corresponds
to the opportunity cost of the time spent in receiving and processing the information transmitted
by the commercial message, and we interpret it as a ”privacy cost”. We assume that the privacy
cost is heterogeneous across consumers. More precisely, we consider that, at each point x on
the line [0, 1], the N consumers have privacy costs distributed in the support [0, α]. Concretely,
at point x, the privacy cost for the N consumers is given by the function C = α y, where the
index y ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of disutility of receiving advertising without being interested
in the product. Regarding the effectiveness of direct advertising, under opt-in advertising, only a
fraction of consumers (with relatively low values of y) located at each point x will be reached by the
campaign, whereas, under direct advertising without permission, all the first-period clients receive
ads, so all are exposed to the direct advertising campaign.
The timing of the game is as follows. In τ = 0, both firms launch a mass advertising campaign
and simultaneously compete in prices, (p01, p
0
2). In τ = 1, consumers make their purchasing decisions
and, under opt-in advertising, each seller asks its clients for their permission to use their contact
information for commercial purposes. In τ = 2, firms simultaneously choose their advertising
strategy, mass or direct advertising,10 and compete in prices, (p21, p
2
2). Next, we look for subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of the game and, for the sake of simplicity, we focus the analysis
on symmetric pure-strategy equilibria.
In order to understand how the switch from mass to database advertising can affect the func-
tioning of the market, we begin by studying the benchmark case of mass advertising, i.e. when both
firms use only the mass media in τ = 0 and τ = 2. Given that a mass advertising campaign reaches
all potential buyers, in this full information situation, the model does not have intertemporal effects,
so sellers face the same competitive scenario in τ = 0 and τ = 2, thus yielding the same equilibrium
prices in both periods. To obtain the equilibrium, we note that a consumer located at a distance
9It is clear that mass advertising can also impose nuisance costs, but our model implicitly assumes that nuisance
costs are higher when firms use database advertising and we normalize the nuisance costs of mass advertising to zero.














1 ≥ x ≥ 0 from firm 1 achieves a utility U = v− tx− pτ1 from buying firm 1’s product and a utility
U = v − t(1− x)− pτ2 from buying firm 2’s product. We focus the analysis on the market scenario
where, in equilibrium, both firms actively compete for consumers (i.e. the market is covered) and
obtain positive profits.11 In this set-up, consumers located at x are indifferent between buying the
product from either firm, where x is defined by the condition v−tx−pτ1 = v−t(1−x)−pτ2 . From this
equation, we obtain that x =
pτ2−pτ1+t
2t and the firms’ full-information demand functions are x
0
1 = N
x, x02 = N(1− x), x21 = λN x and x22 = λN(1− x). Profit maximization yields that the equilibrium
price in τ = 0 and τ = 2 is pmj = t, where the superscript m denotes the mass advertising solution
and, in equilibrium, the market is covered, x01 + x
0




2 = λN . Finally, sellers obtain a










, in τ = 2, and, in order to guarantee the
existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium with mass advertising, throughout the paper we will assume













where δ is the discount rate from τ = 2 to τ = 0.
Next, we assume that, in τ = 2, firms have database advertising available. Considering that
the main goal of this paper is to evaluate distinct public policies towards direct advertising, we
analyze the functioning of the market under two regulatory scenarios: (i) firms can freely use direct
advertising without asking for permission, i.e. no-regulation, and (ii) the government introduces
an opt-in provision, i.e. direct advertising without permission is banned. Our first step is to
characterize the market outcome when regulation is active, that is, when the use of direct advertising
without permission is banned and both sellers can choose only between opt-in advertising and mass
advertising. We look for an SPNE in which both firms find it optimal to use opt-in advertising, so
we begin by solving the game in τ = 2. Let us assume that firms set first-period prices (p01, p
0
2) and
that, in τ = 1, both firms ask consumers for their consent to send them direct ads in the future.
In line with seller expectations, we assume that, in τ = 1, consumers can anticipate that, in τ = 2,
firms will again launch a new product with a ”similar nature”, that is, with a similar consumer
valuation (v) and a similar pattern of product differentiation (t). However, in τ = 1, the particular
characteristics of the firms’ future products are unknown, so we consider that (i) first-period buyers
expect to be interested in a future product only with a probability 1 > λ > 0, and (ii) they cannot
anticipate a greater preference for any of the two future products, that is, all of them consider that
their future (expected) location on the linear potential market is xe = 12 . In this framework, let
us assume that, at each point x on the line [0, 1], a fraction 1 > y > 0 of consumers accepts being
included in the database. The size of, for example, firm 1’s database will be N
p02−p01+t
2t y, and we





























consider that the cost of a direct advertising campaign depends on the size of the market segment






, where β denotes the
mailing (or telephone call) cost per ad, and we assume that reaching the market with targeting is
cheaper than with mass advertising, i.e. Nβ < NA.
Given that a seller’s database contains contact information only about its first-period clients,
the use of direct advertising based on previous sales records allows firms to target their direct ads
to a distinct set of consumers. As a result, in τ = 2, all consumers become captives of one of the
sellers, that is, direct advertising fragments the market into local monopolies. Accordingly, firm 1,
maximizes profits taking into account that the maximum demand that it can serve is N x y λ so,
in τ = 2, this seller faces a demand function
x21 = N
(














1 − βN x y
]




1 − βN x y. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that the firm pricing strategies do not generate quantity distortions, that
is, consumers’ valuations of the products are sufficiently high (or transportation costs sufficiently
low) so, under monopoly pricing, the market is covered, which implies v ≥ 2t (see the Appendix).
In τ = 1, firms build their databases and, under opt-in advertising, the key point is how many
consumers authorize the use of their contact information for commercial purposes. If, in τ = 2,
firms use opt-in advertising, consumers can obtain a (potential) positive benefit from consumption
only if they agree to receive direct advertising. However, if, ex-post, consumers are not interested
in the products, when they receive direct ads (e.g. telephone calls) they suffer a privacy cost.
This implies that consumers will agree to be included in the database only if the expected benefit
surpasses the expected cost, that is, if λ(v−pe1− txe) ≥ (1−λ)αy, where pe1 represents the expected
price of the second-period product and xe = 12 is the expected location on the line in τ = 2. From
this condition, we can identify the consumer (y) who is indifferent between accepting and rejecting
the inclusion in the database, λ(v − pe1 − t2) = (1 − λ)αy, so the fraction y of the N consumers
located at point x agree to be in the database, with
y =
λ(v − pe1 − t2)
α(1− λ) .
Finally, in τ = 0, firms maximize the discounted value of their total expected profit, considering a














1 − βN x y
]
.
From the above discussion, it follows that database advertising could fragment the market into













monopoly price, it is clear that firm 1 could react by extending the reach of its advertising campaign
(by using the mass media) and undercutting the price, in order to poach some consumers from the
rival’s database. The key issue then is whether, in equilibrium, the market can be fragmented, that
is, if both firms can find it optimal to use opt-in advertising, rather than mass advertising, and to
charge the monopoly price. The following proposition addresses this point.




2 , there exists a
symmetric pure-strategy SPNE in which both firms employ opt-in advertising and




(v − t)− βλ
]
λ y ; 0
]
< pmj ,
(ii) in τ = 1, the fraction of consumers who agree to be in the database is y = λt2α(1−λ) ,







2 −AN < ΠmTj if p0j > 0
−AN + δ
(
v − t− βλ
)
Nλy
2 ≶ ΠmTj if p0j = 0




2 , the deviation strategy of mass
advertising in τ = 2 is not profitable because the deviation price is not sufficiently high and is too
expensive to poach consumers from the rival, so the game has an equilibrium in which, in τ = 2,
the market fragments into local monopolies.12 The comparison between the market outcome when
firms use only mass advertising, and when they use opt-in direct advertising, yields some interesting
results. The use of opt-in advertising implies, on the one hand, that firms achieve a monopolistic
position in their local market and, on the other, that advertising cost-efficiency increases, which help
marketers to achieve high profits in τ = 2. Given that the level of second-period profits depends on
the number of consumers included in the database, firms have a strategic incentive to advertise low
first-period prices in order to increase their customer base. In line with this intuition, Proposition
1 shows that, compared to the benchmark case (where firms use only mass advertising), opt-in
advertising results in a reallocation of market power from the first to the second period. Another
remarkable result is that, if δλ [λ(v−t)−β]2α(1−λ) > 1, firms find it optimal to sell their first-period goods
at zero price,13 which yields negative profits in τ = 1. This can be interpreted as an aggressive




), the game has an equilibrium in which




and (ii) v > 4t
y
or




, the game does not have a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, so the equilibrium must
be in mixed strategies where firms combine, within a planning period, the use of mass and direct advertising. The
analysis of optimal pricing when firms combine the use of mass and direct advertising is addressed in Esteban and
Hernández (2014).













introductory offer, where a firm initially (τ = 1) sells the good for free in order to foster sales
and gain a large customer base which, later (τ = 2), can be used to obtain high profits. We also
observe that the equilibrium fraction of consumers who agree to be included in the database, y,
is positively related to both t and λ. Given that, in τ = 2, firms charge the monopoly price and
that, in τ = 1, potential consumers do not know the second-period products’ characteristics, all
of them can anticipate only that their expected location on the line will be xe = 12 so, if they are
interested in the product, the expected surplus from consumption is t2 , which explains why, as t
increases, more consumers will be willing to be in the database.14 Regarding λ, when this parameter
increases, consumers anticipate a higher benefit and a lower cost of being in the database, so the
equilibrium value of y increases. Proposition 1 also indicates that, unlike the benchmark case of
mass advertising, when p0j > 0, the optimal first-period prices depend on the advertising costs. This
is so because, under mass advertising, a change in the first-period price has no effect on the cost of
the advertising campaign, whereas, under direct advertising, given, for example, firm 2’s price, a
decrease in firm 1’s first-period price yields an increase in the size of the database and, therefore,
a higher advertising cost in τ = 2. This implies that firms internalize the cost of advertising when
setting first-period prices and, as a result, when p0j > 0, this price is positively related to the
advertising cost parameter. We also note that first-period prices are positively related to α and
negatively related to λ. This occurs because an increase in α (vs. λ) reduces (vs. increases) y and,
therefore, the efficiency of opt-in advertising, thus softening (vs. stimulating) price competition in
τ = 0. We finally observe that a higher level of product differentiation has two effects on first-
period prices. A higher t directly softens first-period price competition but, indirectly, increases y,
i.e. the efficiency of opt-in advertising, which stimulates price competition in τ = 0. Some simple
calculations15 show that the first effect dominates, so prices are positively related to the degree of
product differentiation in τ = 0 and negatively related in τ = 2.
Regarding profits, compared to the benchmark case, where firms use only mass advertising,
opt-in direct advertising generates two effects that work in opposite directions. The greater cost
the model will simply give more weight to the positive-prices market outcome.
14As mentioned in footnote 7, a key aspect of our model is that, in t = 2, consumers do not purchase a product
unless they receive an ad. This occurs because we are implicitly assuming that consumers incur a search cost (e.g.
a common transportation cost, s) to visit the store. Although potential buyers may be aware of product existence,
they ignore the characteristics of the products so, in the absence of ad information, we consider that the expected
surplus of visiting the store is negative, λ(v− pe1 − txe) < s. By contrast, if consumers receive information about the
new product, with a probability λ, they are interested in purchasing the new good and we assume that the expected
surplus of visiting the store is positive, (v− pe1 − txe) > s. This means that, in equilibrium, it holds that t2 > s > λt2 .
15When p0j > 0, we have that
∂p0j
∂t
= 1 − δλλ(v−2t)−β
2α(1−λ) , and the condition p
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efficiency and monopoly power that firms enjoy in τ = 2 increases profits, but targeting yields
lower market prices in τ = 0, which results in lower profits. According to proposition 1, the
final effect on profits depends on market conditions. In particular, we find (see the Appendix)
that database advertising yields higher profits in markets where the consumers’ valuation of their
favorite variety, v, and the savings in advertising costs, A − β, are high. A notable result is that,
when p0j > 0, then the switch from mass to targeted advertising yields lower profits whereas, when
p0j = 0, profits can increase. This occurs because firms have a strong incentive to lower prices in
τ = 0 in order to take advantage of database advertising in τ = 2. The fact that, in equilibrium,
it holds that p0j > 0, implies that the parameter t is relatively large. In this scenario, firms fully
internalize the intertemporal effect generated by targeting, which results in a strong decrease in
first-period profits that leads to lower intertemporal profits. This means that firms engage in a
typical prisoner’s dilemma, that is, both sellers are better off using only mass advertising but, in
order to save advertising costs, have a strong incentive to use their databases in τ = 2 which,
indirectly, generates more intense price competition in τ = 0 and, finally, lower overall profits. By
contrast, if t is small, firms cannot fully internalize this intertemporal effect, i.e. p0j = 0 works as
a lower bound that limits the decrease in first-period prices, and, as a result, targeting can yield
higher total intertemporal profits.
Having described the market outcome under regulation (direct advertising is banned without
permission), an interesting question is whether the use of opt-in advertising can lead to an equilib-
rium in the absence of government intervention.
Proposition 2 (No regulation) If firms can freely use direct advertising without permission, the
game does not have a symmetric pure-strategy SPNE in which firms use opt-in advertising.
Market interaction cannot generate an equilibrium in which both firms use opt-in advertising
because if, for example, firm 2 used opt-in direct advertising, the use of direct advertising without
permission would allow firm 1 to simply increase the reach of its advertising campaign and, therefore,
the level of profits, so there is a profitable deviation. This means that firms have a clear incentive
to use direct advertising without permission, rather than opt-in advertising. Next, we describe
the market equilibrium under no regulation, that is, when direct advertising without permission is
permitted. If both sellers use direct advertising, then, given first-period prices (p01, p
0
2), the size of
firm 1’s and firm 2’s databases are, N
p02−p01+t
2t and N(1 −
p02−p01+t
2t ), respectively. As in the case of
opt-in advertising, with direct advertising without permission, firms can target their direct ads to a
distinct set of consumers, thus fragmenting the market into local monopolies, so profit maximization













firm 2 face the demand functions:
x21 = N
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respectively. The following proposition describes the equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (No regulation) If 4t ≥ v ≥ 2t and A ≥ λ(v−t)4 +
β
2 , there exists a symmetric pure-
strategy SPNE in which, in τ = 2, both firms employ direct advertising without permission and the














2 −AN < ΠmTj if p0j > 0
−AN + δ
(
v − t− βλ
)
Nλ
2 ≶ ΠmTj if p0j = 0
Comparing propositions 1 and 3, we conclude that, with both opt-in advertising and direct
advertising without permission, first-period prices (vs. second-period prices) are positively (vs.
negatively) related to the degree of product differentiation, t. Further, compared to opt-in adver-
tising, the effect of direct advertising without permission on firm profits and pricing strategies,16
and the comparative static properties of the equilibrium, are similar, so we can conclude that, com-
pared to the benchmark case of mass advertising, opt-in advertising and direct advertising without
permission have, in qualitative terms, a similar effect on the pattern of price competition and the
functioning of the market. However, it is important to note that first-period prices with opt-in
advertising are higher than or equal to direct advertising without permission, whereas aggregate
profits with opt-in advertising are lower than or equal to direct advertising without permission.
This occurs because, with opt-in advertising, selling in the first period is less valuable for firms, as
it does not lead to as many subsequent sales, so sellers have a lower incentive to decrease first-period
prices to increase market share. Further, opt-in advertising is less efficient than direct advertising
without permission in reaching the set of potential clients. This explains why, compared to direct
advertising without permission, opt-in advertising yields lower profits.
The next section discusses how direct advertising without permission and opt-in advertising can
affect market performance, and how a regulatory policy of database advertising can affect social
welfare.
16The impact of direct advertising on prices and profits in our model contrasts with Esteban and Hernández (2014),
where firms face a totally inelastic demand and (i) first-period prices are always positive and, (ii) compared to the













3 Welfare and policy implications of direct advertising
Our previous analysis suggests that database advertising generates (i) high advertising-cost effi-
ciency, (ii) an intertemporal transfer of market power from τ = 0 to τ = 2, and (iii) privacy costs
for consumers who receive ads and are not interested in second-period products. This section ad-
dresses the welfare and policy aspects of direct advertising. In particular, we evaluate the impact
of the two types of direct advertising (without permission and opt-in) on social welfare, so that we
can shed light on how distinct public policies about direct advertising, e.g. to allow or to restrict
the use of direct advertising without permission, can affect firms and consumers.
We begin by noting that total welfare equals the value of the good for all buyers, minus the
advertising, transportation and privacy costs. Regardless of the type of direct advertising used by
firms, in τ = 0, both sellers use mass advertising and the market is covered, so the level of social
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In order to understand how opt-in advertising vs. direct advertising without permission can affect
social welfare, we first compare the private level of y with the socially-optimal level, y∗, that is,
with the value of y that maximizes social welfare.
Proposition 4 If firms use opt-in advertising, the private level of y is below the socially optimal
value, i.e. y < y∗.
From a social perspective, the differences between direct advertising without permission and
opt-in advertising affect several aspects. First, under opt-in advertising, consumers decide whether
or not to be included in a firm’s database and, given y < 1, a fraction of them refuse the offer,
thus reducing the firms’ potential demand in τ = 2. Proposition 4 indicates that, from a social
perspective, consumers have too little incentive to accept their inclusion in a database, which
17We assume that consumers’ valuation of the products is sufficiently high, so that the level of welfare under both













generates a negative externality on firms in the form of a quantity distortion in the product market,
y < y∗, with the corresponding welfare loss. Second, compared to direct advertising without
permission, under opt-in advertising a lower number of consumers receive direct ads, which reduces
both the cost of the advertising campaign and the privacy costs.
According to propositions 1, 2 and 3, in the absence of a regulation, firms have a clear incentive
to use direct advertising without permission rather than opt-in advertising, and the problem is
that consumers who are not interested in second-period products and have a relatively high privacy
cost receive undesired direct ads, which has a negative effect on welfare. Therefore, the protection
of consumer privacy can justify government intervention aimed at restricting the use of direct
advertising without permission, in favor of opt-in advertising. However, the use of opt-in advertising
generates quantity distortions, so there is a policy dilemma with no easy answer. The following
proposition addresses this problem,
Proposition 5 A regulatory policy banning the use of direct advertising without permission and
generating opt-in advertising results in a welfare loss.
In order to evaluate a regulatory policy for database advertising, it is necessary to consider
three different goals. First, government intervention must favor advertising cost efficiency, that
is, firms should use database advertising rather than mass advertising. Second, the advertising
strategy used by firms should favor socially-positive exchanges between firms and consumers, i.e.
quantity distortions should be minimized. Finally, it is also important to reduce consumer privacy
costs. If the government prohibits the use of direct advertising without permission, then firms will
employ either the mass media or opt-in direct advertising and proposition 5 indicates that, in the
latter case, the regulatory policy yields a welfare loss. This occurs because, if mass advertising is
available, firms will find it optimal to use opt-in advertising only if it is relatively efficient, that is,
if y is sufficiently large, which requires a small α. In this scenario, proposition 5 indicates that the
regulatory policy will fail because the gain in social welfare induced by the savings in privacy and
advertising costs is lower than the welfare loss generated by the quantity distortion associated with
opt-in advertising. Put another way, given the quantity distortion induced by opt-in advertising,
the only possibility that, compared to direct advertising without permission, opt-in advertising
increases welfare is that the savings in privacy costs are very high, i.e. α is large. However, when
α reaches the corresponding critical level, opt-in advertising has a low effectiveness (y is low) and
firms always find it optimal to deviate by using mass advertising so, once again, the regulatory
policy will fail, this time by generating an increase in advertising costs (firms use mass advertising













Next, we evaluate how a ban on direct advertising without permission affects firms and con-
sumers.
Proposition 6 If the degree of product differentiation is relatively large (so that p0j > 0 with
direct advertising without permission), a regulatory policy banning the use of direct advertising
without permission and generating opt-in advertising does not affect firms’ profits whereas, under
low differentiation (so that p0j = 0 with opt-in advertising), the regulation lowers profits.
If, in equilibrium, it holds that p0j > 0 with direct advertising without permission (which implies
p0j > 0 with opt-in advertising), then profits with the two types of direct advertising coincide, so a
ban on direct advertising without permission, generating opt-in advertising, does not affect firms.
However, if p0j = 0 with opt-in advertising (which implies p
0
j = 0 with direct advertising without
permission), firms achieve higher profits with direct advertising without permission than with opt-
in advertising, so we conclude that the regulatory policy yields lower firm profits. Concerning
consumers, we note that, regardless of the type of direct advertising used by the firms, in τ = 0,













In τ = 2, consumers who receive direct ads achieve a different surplus, depending on whether they
are interested (buyers) or not (non-buyers) in second-period products. Non-buyers only suffer a
privacy cost and, therefore, their (negative) surplus under opt-in advertising and direct advertising
without permission, respectively, is:
CSNB = −N (1− λ) α
y∫
0




The (positive) surplus of buyers under opt-in advertising and direct advertising without permission,
respectively, are:
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dx,
and total consumer surplus is CS = CS0 + δ(CSNB + CSB). Assuming that δ = 1, the follow-
ing proposition illustrates how the prohibition of direct advertising without permission can affect
consumers.
Proposition 7 If the degree of product differentiation is relatively large (so that p0j > 0 with direct
advertising without permission), a regulatory policy banning the use of direct advertising with-













whereas, under low differentiation (so that p0j = 0 with opt-in advertising), the regulation increases
total consumer surplus.
From the consumer perspective, the switch from direct advertising without permission to opt-
in advertising generates three effects. First, they receive less information about new products
in τ = 2, which reduces the surplus achieved from the consumption of second-period products.
Second, compared to direct advertising without permission, the use of opt-in advertising generates
higher first-period prices, which also reduces consumer surplus. Finally, the use of opt-in advertising
reduces privacy costs, which benefits consumers. According to proposition 7, the result of this trade-
off depends crucially on the extent of product differentiation. If the level of product differentiation
is sufficiently high, so that p0j > 0, under both direct advertising without permission and opt-in
advertising, firms fully internalize the intertemporal effects of database advertising on first-period
prices, that is, database advertising yields strong price decreases in τ = 0, and the reduction in prices
is greater with direct advertising without permission than with opt-in advertising. This explains
why the transition from direct advertising without permission to opt-in advertising produces a loss
in consumer surplus. By contrast, when the level of product differentiation is sufficiently low, so
that p0j = 0, the intertemporal effects of database advertising on first-period prices are weaker, and
first-period prices with opt-in advertising and direct advertising without permission coincide. In
this case, the savings in privacy costs induced by opt-in advertising dominates the model, and the
regulatory policy benefits consumers.
Considering Propositions 5 , 6 and 7 together, we can conclude that, when the level of product
differentiation is sufficiently high, so that p0j > 0, a regulatory policy banning the use of direct ad-
vertising without permission, and generating opt-in advertising, leaves profits unchanged, whereas
consumer surplus and, therefore, social welfare, decreases. This means that direct advertising with-
out permission, not only increases welfare, but also (weakly Pareto) dominates opt-in advertising,
so a regulatory policy aimed at protecting consumers ends up lowering both consumer surplus
and social welfare. By contrast, when p0j = 0, government intervention benefits consumers but, in
this case, firms obtain lower profits and this effect dominates, so social welfare decreases. Accord-
ingly, our model suggests that the permissive use of consumers’ private information for commercial
purposes, that is, the use of direct advertising without permission, improves market performance.
4 Conclusions
This paper studies, first, how two different types of direct advertising, without permission and













policy implications of database advertising. We formulate a three-stage price competition game in
which two firms, initially, use mass advertising to reach consumers, then, build an in-house list with
the contact information of their past clients and, finally, depending on regulatory provisions, can
choose between using mass advertising, direct advertising without permission, or opt-in advertising
to provide consumers with information about a new product. We find that, compared to the
benchmark case of mass advertising, the use of direct advertising (with or without permission) can
fragment the market into local monopolies. This leads sellers to engage in a race to gain a customer
base by competing more aggressively in first-period prices. As a result, database advertising yields
an intertemporal transfer of market power from the first to the second period. A notable result is
that firms can find it optimal to follow an aggressive introductory offer (zero first-period prices)
aimed at building a large customer base which, later, allows them to obtain high profits. Further,
we show that, if first-period prices are positive, then database advertising generates lower firm
profits than mass advertising, whereas profits can increase if first-period prices are zero. Finally,
we find that, compared to direct advertising without permission, the use of opt-in advertising can
lead to higher first-period prices and lower profits.
Our analysis also indicates that marketers have a clear incentive to use direct advertising without
permission rather than opt-in advertising, which has important welfare implications. Under direct
advertising without permission, some consumers with relatively high privacy costs are not interested
in second-period products and they may receive a great deal of undesired direct mail, which has
a strong negative effect on welfare. Therefore, the protection of consumer privacy may justify
government regulation aimed at restricting the use of direct advertising without permission in
favor of opt-in advertising. However, under opt-in advertising, a fraction of consumers refuse the
offer to be included in the database and we show that, compared to the socially optimal solution,
this fraction is too large, which generates a strong quantity distortion in the product market, with
the corresponding welfare loss. Regarding this policy dilemma, we find that a regulatory policy
banning the use of direct advertising without permission and generating opt-in advertising results
in a welfare loss. Regarding firms and consumers, if the degree of product differentiation in the
market is relatively large, the regulatory policy does not affect firms’ profits and generates a lower
consumer surplus, whereas, under low product-differentiation, the regulation lowers profits and
increases consumer surplus.
In summary, a regulatory ban on direct advertising without permission aimed at protecting
consumer privacy can generate a welfare loss, for two reasons. First, the prohibition may lead firms
to use mass advertising, which increases advertising costs, and second, if firms choose to use opt-













advertising exceeds the saving in privacy costs. Accordingly, we find that the regulatory policy fails.
Nevertheless, it is obvious that, beyond the gains in efficiency illustrated by our model, the abusive
and massive commercial use of consumer private information may be considered overly intrusive,
thus generating substantial losses in social welfare, which can justify restrictions on the use of
direct advertising without permission. However, our work suggests that government intervention
can generate significant distortions in the functioning of markets so, in order to find an ”optimal”
regulatory policy, it is important to carefully consider the potential negative impact on efficiency
induced by a restrictive approach towards the commercial use of private consumer information.
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5 Appendix
Proof. Proposition 1. We look for an SPNE of the game in which, in τ = 2, both firms use
only opt-in direct advertising. Solving the game backwards, if both firms use opt-in advertising,
then, given the first-period prices (p01, p
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t , which implies p
2
1 > v − t. Then, the solution of the
maximization problem is p21 =
v
2 , so the condition p
2
1 > v − t implies v < 2t, which contradicts our






1, i.e. p21 ≤ v − t. Under this condition, we have that d Π1dp21 = Nλx y > 0, which implies that the
firm charges the maximum possible price, p21 = v − t, and achieves a profit:
Π21 = (v − t)N
(
p02 − p01 + t
2t
)
y λ − βN
(




Going backwards, in τ = 1, consumers decide whether or not to be included in a database.
According to our previous analysis, the indifferent consumer is y =
λ(v−pe1− t2 )
α(1−λ) and, under rational
expectations, pe1 = p
2
1 = v−t, the fraction of consumers who agree to be in a database is y = λt2α(1−λ) .
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and, using the symmetry condition, p02 = p
0
1, we obtain p
0
j = t−δ [λ(v − t)− β] y ≥ 0. The condition
Πm2j > 0 implies A <
λt
2 , and, therefore, our assumption that β < A yields β <
λt
2 . Considering
also that v ≥ 2t, we have that λ(v − t)− β ≥ λt− β > 0, so p0j = t− δ [λ(v − t)− β] y < pmj = t,
and that p2j = v − t ≥ pmj . Finally, considering the optimal pricing strategies, it is easy to check




2 −NA < ΠmTj , whereas, if p0j = 0, then
ΠT1 = −NA+ δ
(
v − t− βλ
)
Nλy
2 ≶ ΠmTj , depending on the parameter values.
In order to confirm that these pricing-advertising strategies are an equilibrium, we must check
that firms have no profitable deviations. In this regard, we note that, in τ = 2, there are two
possible deviations:
(A) Firms can deviate by launching a mass advertising campaign and competing for the segment
of fully-informed consumers, i.e. those consumers informed by firm 2. Let us assume that firm 2
uses opt-in advertising and sets p22 = v − t. Taking into account that the size of firm 2’s database
is x22 = (1− x)Ny, if firm 1 deviates by using mass advertising and charging a deviation price pd1,











In order to obtain the optimal deviation price, let us begin by considering that
v−pd1
t > 1 >
v−pd1
2t .
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16t y −NA. This is the maximum deviation profit when
v−pd1

























2 . Some algebraic opera-
tions yield that this expression holds if
[
v2y2 + vyt(8− 12y)
]
+t [16t+ 12ty(y − 2)] > 0 and, consid-
ering that y ≤ 1 and v ≥ 4ty , it follows that
[
v2y2 + vyt(8− 12y)
]
≥ 0 and [16t+ 12ty(y − 2)] > 0,
thus proving that [v y+2t(2−y)]
2






2 . Therefore, the condition Π
d





2 , thus yielding a contradiction. This means that, if 2t +
4t
y > v ≥ 4ty firm 1 always
finds it optimal to deviate, so the pricing-advertising game does not have an equilibrium with opt-in
advertising.





= 1, i.e. pd1 ≤ v − 2t. In this case, we
have that d Π1
dpd1
= Nλ > 0, so the firm charges the maximum possible price, pd1 = v − 2t, and the













maximum deviation profit is Πd1 = (v − 2t)Nλ − NA. We now prove, by contradiction, that this
deviation is always optimal, that is, (v − 2t)Nλ − NA > (v − t − βλ )
Nλy
2 . Let us assume that
(v− 2t)Nλ−NA ≤ (v− t− βλ )
Nλy
2 , that is,
A






















































2λt , thus yielding a contradiction. From this it follows that, if v ≥ 2t + 4ty , the
pricing-advertising game does not have an equilibrium with opt-in advertising.

































2t ≥ 1, the
optimization problem generates a kinked solution, pd1 = v − t, and the corresponding profit is
Πd1 =
Nλ(v−t)(4−y)














2 , the deviation is not profitable.
(B) Firms can also deviate by launching a mass advertising campaign and charging the monopoly
price, pd1 = v − t, to the segment of uninformed consumers, i.e. those consumers who are not
informed by firm 2. Let us assume that firm 2 uses opt-in advertising and sets p22 = v − t. Under




2 , and the firm
achieves a deviation profit:
Πd1 = (v − t) [Nλ−Nλ(1− x)(1− x̂)y]−NA
The firm will not deviate if Πd1 ≤ (v− t− βλ )
Nλy




2 , i.e. the same
condition as in part (A).




2 , firms do not have profitable deviation so,
if direct advertising without permission is banned, the game has a pure-strategy equilibrium where
marketers find it optimal to use opt-in direct advertising.
Proof. Proposition 2. Let us assume that firm 2 uses opt-in direct advertising and sets
p22 = v − t. If firm 1 also uses opt-in advertising, it obtains a profit Π21 = (v − t)Ny λ2 −
βNy
2 .
If the firm deviates by using direct advertising without permission, the optimal deviation price is
pd1 = v−t and the resulting profit is Πd1 =
(







2 , so there is a profitable
deviation.
Proof. Proposition 3. The proofs of propositions 1 and 3 are similar, the only difference






















. Accordingly, when both firms use direct
advertising without permission, in τ = 2, they will charge the monopoly price, p2j = v − t , and
firm 1 obtains a profit:
Π21 = (v − t)N
(
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and, using the symmetry condition, p02 = p
0
1, we obtain p
0
j = t − δ [λ(v − t)− β] ≥ 0. Considering
the optimal pricing strategies, it is easy to check that, if p0j > 0, the equilibrium level of profits is
ΠT1 =
t N
2 −NA < ΠmTj , whereas, if p0j = 0, then ΠT1 = −AN+δ
(
v − t− βλ
)
Nλ
2 ≶ ΠmTj , depending
on the parameter values.
Next, we check that firms have no profitable deviations. In τ = 2, there are three possible
deviations:
(A) Firms can deviate by launching a mass advertising campaign and competing for the segment
of fully informed consumers. Let us assume that firm 2 uses direct advertising without permission
and sets p22 = v− t. Taking into account that the size of firm 2’s database is x22 = (1− x)N , if firm
1 deviates by using mass advertising and charging a deviation price pd1, then it captures a demand










. Following the same reasoning
as in the proof of proposition 1, if
v−pd1
t > 1 >
v−pd1





corresponding profit is Πd1 =
Nλ[v +2t]2
16t −NA. This is the maximum deviation profit when
v−pd1
2d < 1,
i.e. when v < 6t, and when
v−pd1
t ≥ 1, i.e. v ≥ 4t. Firm 1 will not deviate if Πd1 ≤
(
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Some algebraic operations yield that this expression holds if (v − 2t)2 > 0 so, as in the proof of
proposition 1, we obtain a contradiction. This means that, if 6t > v ≥ 4t, firm 1 always finds
it optimal to deviate, so the pricing-advertising game does not have an equilibrium with direct
advertising without permission.









so the firm charges the maximum possible price, pd1 = v − 2t, and the maximum deviation profit is
Πd1 = (v−2t)Nλ−NA. We now prove, by contradiction, that this deviation is always optimal, that
is, (v − 2t)Nλ−NA >
(
v − t− βλ
)
Nλ
2 . Let us assume that (v − 2t)Nλ−NA ≤
(
















that is, Aλ ≥ v − 2t − v2 + t2 +
β




2 , this implies that
t
2 > A ≥
v − 2t − v2 + t2 +
β
2λ , which yields v < 4t −
β
λ , thus yielding a contradiction. From this it follows
that, if v ≥ 6t, the pricing-advertising game does not have an equilibrium with direct advertising
without permission.







t and, as in the proof of proposition 1, the optimal
deviation price is pd1 = v − t and the corresponding profit is Πd1 = 3Nλ(v−t)4 −NA. Firm 1 will not
deviate if Πd1 ≤
(
v − t− βλ
)
Nλ









the deviation is not profitable.
(B) Firms can deviate by launching a mass advertising campaign and charging the monopoly
price, pd1 = v − t, to the segment of uninformed consumers. Let us assume that firm 2 uses direct
advertising without permission and sets p22 = v − t. Under this deviation strategy, the indifferent




2 and the firm achieves a deviation profit:
Πd1 = (v − t) [Nλ−Nλ(1− x)(1− x̂)]−NA
The firm will not deviate if Πd1 ≤
(
v − t− βλ
)
Nλ




2 , i.e. the same
condition as in part (A).
(C) Firms can deviate in τ = 1 by using opt-in direct advertising instead of direct advertising
without permission. Let us assume that firm 2 uses direct advertising without permission and sets
p22 = v − t. If firm 1 uses opt-in advertising, the optimal deviation price is pd1 = v − t and the firm
achieves a deviation profit:
Π1 = (v − t) Nλ
(





p02 − p01 + t
2t
)















In summary, if 4t > v ≥ 2t and A ≥ λ(v−t)4 +
β
2 , firms do not have profitable deviation, so
the game has a pure-strategy equilibrium where marketers find it optimal to use direct advertising
without permission. We finally note that, as in proposition 1, when p0j = t − δ [λ(v − t)− β] > 0,
it holds that [λ(v − t)− β] > 0, so p0j < pmj = t.
Proof. Proposition 4. We obtain the socially optimal value of y by maximizing social
welfare:
Max y W













α (1−λ) . The condition y
∗ > y = λt2α (1−λ) , implies λ(v −
t)− β > 0, which, according to the proof of proposition 1, holds.
Proof. Proposition 5. Taking into account that y = λt2α (1−λ) , total welfare under opt-in

















− N α (1−λ)2 −Nβ. Some calculations yield that:
WB −WA = N [λt− 2α(1− λ)]
8α(1− λ) [λ(4v − 3t)− 4β − 2α(1− λ)] .
The first step of the proof is to show that, if y > 13 , i.e. α <
3λt
2(1−λ) , then W
B < WA. Given
y < 1, we have that [λt− 2α(1− λ)] < 0, so WB < WA ⇐⇒ [λ(4v − 3t)− 4β − 2α(1− λ)] >
0, that is, α < λ(4v−3t)−4β2(1−λ) . We now prove that α <
3λt
2(1−λ) implies α <
λ(4v−3t)−4β




2(1−λ) , i.e. λ(4v − 6t) − 4β ≥ 0. To this end, we simply note that v ≥ 2t, so
λ(4v− 6t)− 4β ≥ λ2t− 4β > 0, given that A < λt2 , and our assumption that β < A implies β < λt2 .
Next, given that, under the regulation, firms cannot use direct advertising without permission,
if they find it optimal to use opt-in advertising it is because there is no profitable deviation, which,




+ βy2 . Therefore, considering that
A < λt2 , we obtain
λt
2





















that is y > 2λt3λt−2β >
2
3 . In summary, if, under the regulatory ban of direct advertising without
permission, firms find it optimal to use opt-in advertising, we know that y > 23 and this condition
directly implies WB < WA.
Proof. Proposition 6. We first note that the condition p0j > 0 with direct advertising
without permission implies that p0j > 0 also with opt-in advertising, whereas the condition p
0
j =
0 with opt-in advertising implies that p0j = 0 also with direct advertising without permission.
Having clarified this, if p0j > 0 with direct advertising without permission, propositions 1 and 3
indicate that the levels of profit with the two types of direct advertising coincide and, therefore, a
ban on direct advertising without permission generating opt-in advertising does not affect profits.





v − t− βλ
)
Nλy





v − t− βλ
)
Nλ
2 . Given that y < 1, we have that a ban on direct advertising without
permission, which yields opt-in advertising, results in lower firm profits.
Proof. Proposition 7. Taking into account that y = λt2α (1−λ) , and considering δ = 1, when
p0j = 0 with opt-in advertising, total consumer surplus under opt-in advertising is CS
B = N(v− t4)+
N λ
2t2
8α(1−λ) and, under direct advertising without permission, is CS















and some calculations yield:
CSB − CSA = N [λt− 2α(1− λ)]
2
8α(1− λ) > 0.
If p0j > 0 with direct advertising without permission, proposition 6 indicates that profits with direct
advertising without permission and opt-in advertising coincide, whereas proposition 5 implies that
WB < WA. Given that total welfare is the sum of profits and consumer surplus, we can conclude
that CSB < CSA.
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